[port-peer-review] Re: Sarbo -- Practical Bearings of Peirce's Maxim
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| "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings,
| we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception
| of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." [5.402]
|
| http://lab.bootstrap.org/port/papers/2002/sarbo.html#nid012 (02)
| Following Peirce's maxim, concepts emerge from the effects of an object.
| Because any effect is a `real' world phenomenon, it follows that we may
| know about the effects of an object via perception. The conceived effects
| form the basis for our conception of an object which is knowledge. Because,
| as Peirce maintains, we may know about phenomena by means of signs (for which
| reason they must be universal), we may finally conclude that the pragmatic maxim
| is about knowledge, which is emerging from perception and represented by means of
| signs. The existence of such knowledge is a necessary condition for conceiving the
| practical bearings of effects (which include habits), and for conceiving those effects
| as the whole of the conception of an object (which involves reasoning).
|
| http://lab.bootstrap.org/port/papers/2002/sarbo.html#nid013 (03)
Janos, (04)
Concepts are signs in the mind, in fact, they are symbols.
When you say "concepts emerge from the effects of an object"
you appear to impose a causal or at least a temporal order
on the relation of objects and concepts, whereby objects
precede concepts. This can happen, of course, but is
not a necessary feature of the sign definition: (05)
| Logic is 'formal semiotic'. A sign is something, 'A', which brings
| something, 'B', its 'interpretant' sign, determined or created by it,
| into the same sort of correspondence (or a lower implied sort) with
| something, 'C', its 'object', as that in which itself stands to 'C'.
| This definition no more involves any reference to human thought than
| does the definition of a line as the place within which a particle lies
| during a lapse of time. (Peirce, NEM 4, 54).
|
| It is from this definition, together with a definition of "formal",
| that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make
| a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic,
| and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my
| non-psychological conception of logic has 'virtually' been quite
| generally held, though not generally recognized. (Peirce, NEM 4, 21).
|
| http://lab.bootstrap.org/port/port-peer-review/0205/msg00007.html#nid04 (06)
The supporting cast of this sign definition consists of the other two
big ideas that Peirce calls on, namely, the notion of "correspondence"
and the notion of "determination". Peirce's usages of these two words
are frequently misunderstood by those who take them at their most common
contemporary meanings. Collateral reading will show that "correspondence"
refers to the "triple co-respondence" of object, sign, interpretant, while
Peirce's notion of "determination" is formal and information-theoretic, but
is far from being "causal", "deterministic", "necessitarian", or "temporal"
in the senses that would most likely come to mind today. (07)
Here is a study of Peirce's notion of determination,
along with a few bits of freely associated material: (08)
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Determination (010)
01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02377.html
02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02378.html
03. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02379.html
04. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02380.html
05. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02384.html
06. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02387.html
07. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02388.html
08. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02389.html
09. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02390.html
10. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02391.html
11. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02395.html
12. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02407.html
13. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02550.html
14. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02552.html
15. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02556.html
16. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02594.html
17. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02651.html
18. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02673.html
19. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02706.html
20. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03177.html
21. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03185.html
22. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03188.html (011)
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