Re: [port-peer-review] Re: Sarbo -- Practical Bearings of Peirce's Maxim
Dear Jon, (01)
Thank you for your interesting comments. (02)
Peirce's definition of a sign (Peirce, NEM 4, 54; see also below) makes it clear that
interpretation amounts to a re-presentation of the sign-object relation by a relation
between interpretant and object. Such re-presentations play a fundamental role also in our
model of signs, in which we make an attempt to clarify the semiotic content of cognition
(see our earlier iccs papers with J. Farkas). How such re-presentations arise in our model
is illustrated below. (03)
Assume the visual observation of smoke. The sensory perception of smoke, which is a quality,
yields an internal sensation (a bio-electric signal) which is another quality, the internal
re-presentation of smoke, which will be our sign. The bio-eletric signal is triggering the
memory, as a result of which the memory provides a response. This memory response is then
used for completing the input quality (our sign). The completion may also depend on the
qualities of the context (e.g. the qualities yielded by the visual observation of a burning
roof). Finally, this cognitive process generates a sign which is a re-presentation of the
input quality, and precisely in the sense of NEM 4,54. Indeed, by means of the memory
information, the relation between smoke and its object (e.g. fire) is re-presented by the
relation between the meaning of smoke (e.g. danger) and fire. (04)
The mediation between sign and interpretant, as well as, between interpretant and object is
_only_ based on the input quality and on the information stored in the memory. In this
process, the sign is given, its object and interpretant are generated (by means of the
memory). It should be emphasized that the same process applies when the input quality is a
thought sign (which first has to be represented degenerately as a quality). (05)
There can be causality between danger and fire by virtue of the causality between the input
quality and its object. Without fire there is no smoke, without smoke there is no danger.
Notice that causality is a relation which is subject to learning. (06)
Because a sign generated can become a memory sign, recognized qualities serve as the basis
for learning the effects of the object of a sign (this of course may need reasoning). The
result of learning is a sign which typically becomes a memory sign. Notice that
interpretation and reaction (which is related to an effect) are synonyms. (07)
Summarized, any sign (which is a concept) arises from an input quality (which is a sign).
The `goal' of sign generation is to explain the meaning of the input quality (e.g. smoke)
in terms of the signs of the memory. Therefore, the resulting sign (e.g. danger), which is a
concept, will be related to the memory signs (which are the signs of the effects of an
object). That concept and object must be related as well. We may conclude that, following
the above model of signs, concepts emerge from the effects of an object, indeed. Such an
object may be `vaguely' defined (cf. the concept of a `pragmatic web') nevertheless it is
the object of that concept. (08)
Best regards,
Janos (09)
Jon Awbrey wrote: (010)
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>
> | "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings,
> | we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception
> | of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." [5.402]
> |
> | http://lab.bootstrap.org/port/papers/2002/sarbo.html#nid012
>
> | Following Peirce's maxim, concepts emerge from the effects of an object.
> | Because any effect is a `real' world phenomenon, it follows that we may
> | know about the effects of an object via perception. The conceived effects
> | form the basis for our conception of an object which is knowledge. Because,
> | as Peirce maintains, we may know about phenomena by means of signs (for which
> | reason they must be universal), we may finally conclude that the pragmatic maxim
> | is about knowledge, which is emerging from perception and represented by means of
> | signs. The existence of such knowledge is a necessary condition for conceiving the
> | practical bearings of effects (which include habits), and for conceiving those effects
> | as the whole of the conception of an object (which involves reasoning).
> |
> | http://lab.bootstrap.org/port/papers/2002/sarbo.html#nid013
>
> Janos,
>
> Concepts are signs in the mind, in fact, they are symbols.
> When you say "concepts emerge from the effects of an object"
> you appear to impose a causal or at least a temporal order
> on the relation of objects and concepts, whereby objects
> precede concepts. This can happen, of course, but is
> not a necessary feature of the sign definition:
>
> | Logic is 'formal semiotic'. A sign is something, 'A', which brings
> | something, 'B', its 'interpretant' sign, determined or created by it,
> | into the same sort of correspondence (or a lower implied sort) with
> | something, 'C', its 'object', as that in which itself stands to 'C'.
> | This definition no more involves any reference to human thought than
> | does the definition of a line as the place within which a particle lies
> | during a lapse of time. (Peirce, NEM 4, 54).
> |
> | It is from this definition, together with a definition of "formal",
> | that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make
> | a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic,
> | and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my
> | non-psychological conception of logic has 'virtually' been quite
> | generally held, though not generally recognized. (Peirce, NEM 4, 21).
> |
> | http://lab.bootstrap.org/port/port-peer-review/0205/msg00007.html#nid04
>
> The supporting cast of this sign definition consists of the other two
> big ideas that Peirce calls on, namely, the notion of "correspondence"
> and the notion of "determination". Peirce's usages of these two words
> are frequently misunderstood by those who take them at their most common
> contemporary meanings. Collateral reading will show that "correspondence"
> refers to the "triple co-respondence" of object, sign, interpretant, while
> Peirce's notion of "determination" is formal and information-theoretic, but
> is far from being "causal", "deterministic", "necessitarian", or "temporal"
> in the senses that would most likely come to mind today.
>
> Here is a study of Peirce's notion of determination,
> along with a few bits of freely associated material:
>
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>
> Determination
>
> 01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02377.html
> 02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02378.html
> 03. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02379.html
> 04. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02380.html
> 05. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02384.html
> 06. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02387.html
> 07. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02388.html
> 08. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02389.html
> 09. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02390.html
> 10. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02391.html
> 11. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02395.html
> 12. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02407.html
> 13. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02550.html
> 14. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02552.html
> 15. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02556.html
> 16. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02594.html
> 17. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02651.html
> 18. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02673.html
> 19. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02706.html
> 20. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03177.html
> 21. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03185.html
> 22. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03188.html
>
> ¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤ (011)